

## **Faith of an Abhavya: Kundakunda's Heretical Dialectic Insight for Contemporary Jaina Science**

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The Self is realized by discriminative wisdom. Just as he is separated by discriminative wisdom so also by the very same discriminative wisdom he is realized.<sup>1</sup>

Practitioners often refer to Jainism as a “scientific religion.” It has been called the “religion for scientists” because of its emphasis on rationalism and experimentation<sup>2</sup>; it has been said that “Jainism is the only religious system that recognizes clearly the truth that religion is a science”<sup>3</sup>; and another account suggests that the realism of Jainism’s duality of matter and soul “has opened new doors for the mutual coordination of Jaina Study [sic] and Modern Science [sic].”<sup>4</sup>

Whether the scientific aspect is specifically one of method, epistemology or collaborative content, it is enough to concede broadly that Jainism considers itself scientific because it not only concerns itself with spiritual or abstracts concepts, but also with “phenomena of the material world and the living beings in the universe.”<sup>5</sup> Jaina scriptures, “detail many aspects concerning the physical world, including physics, chemistry, biology, mathematics and astronomy, architecture, geology, medical sciences, food science and the like.”<sup>6</sup>

This dialectic between spiritual and empirical is a central aspect of Jaina doctrine, resulting in numerous comparisons between ancient teachings and contemporary science.<sup>7</sup> For example, the doctrine suggesting that nothing in the universe can be destroyed is seen as compatible with contemporary scientific perspectives that matter is indestructible. The notion that all plants, vegetables and elements have souls and sensory organs is understood to have anticipated

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certain aspects of biological life sciences. The Jaina doctrine of *Karma* supports the visible variations we see among living creatures and does away with the need for any outside agency. The Jaina theory of *anekāntavāda* has even been compared to Einstein's Theory of Relativity.<sup>8</sup>

In his book *Jaina Studies and Science*, Dr. Mahaveer Raj Gelra offers a comprehensive example of an attempt to fuse Jaina theory with modern science, with chapters devoted to the atomic composition of matter, ecology, the laws of motion, mathematics, psychology and bodily health.<sup>9</sup> Finally, a series of conferences sponsored by the International School for Jaina Studies has been proposed for later this year around the theme "Integrating Modern Science and Spirituality for Social Wellness."<sup>10</sup>

Despite this perceived compatibility and the progressive anticipation in its scriptures of many of the so-called modern discoveries, there remain a number of significant discrepancies between modern science and Jaina theory. These discrepancies derive from those aspects of Jaina metaphysics that must be believed, even in the absence of empirical data or personal experience. Though Jains do not posit an exterior agency, such as God, that exists outside empirical reality, they do maintain a number of ontological presuppositions that function in a similar way such as *karma*, *mokṣa*, soul/self and *parmāṇu* (atom).<sup>11</sup>

The doctrine of *Karma*, for example, and knowledge-obscuring karmic particles, is crucial for Jaina understanding, not only of one's birth form and social status in this life (whether you're born as a bacteria, apple tree, dog, pig, female or male human, wealthy or poor) but also the nature of your ethical decisions and intelligence. However, evolutionary biology suggests that my being born a female human and not an apple tree has more to do with recessive genes and phylogeny (Alexandrov, et. al, 1987).<sup>12</sup> Social psychology might suggest that my pursuit of a Ph.D., my ethical choices or my preferences for a sexual mate may have more to do with my I.Q. than with any karmic influence (Kanazawa, 2010).<sup>13</sup> Neuroscience suggests that my ability to make a free choice is not the result of

*karma*, but of a decision circuit activating between the frontal and parietal cortex (Pesaran, et al., 2008).<sup>14</sup>

Likewise, cognitive science challenges any preconceived notion of the self or of a soul as separate from matter. To date, the notion of self or of an “I,” is often posited as an emergent phenomenon created from 2<sup>nd</sup>-3<sup>rd</sup> level interactions of sub-systems. These substances coordinate to form a unified identity (Maturana and Varela, 1987).

Concepts of *parmāṇu* as a non-reducible aspect of matter is challenged by wave-particle theory expressed in the Schrödinger equation, accepted by nearly all practitioners of quantum mechanics.

*Mokṣa*, or final liberation as telos, is not verifiable. Though alternative modes of consciousness and life-after-death experiences have been documented, proof of an alternative realm of liberated beings remains outside the scope of empirical study. So how will Jains, and especially those interested in maintaining Jainism as a “scientific religion,” begin to deal with these discrepancies?

The question remains as to whether Jains, given these ontological presuppositions, are truly free to compare the relevant alternatives and insights offered through empirical research. According to Nietzschean scholar Walter Kaufmann, exploring such alternatives is, “the heart of rationality, the essence of scientific method, and the meaning of intellectual integrity.”<sup>15</sup> Kaufmann calls this exploration of alternatives the “canon” which is shaped by standards of honesty and a series of imperatives.

Confronted with a proposition, view, belief, hypothesis, conviction - one’s own or another person’s - those with high standards of honesty apply the canon, which commands us to ask seven questions: (1) What does this mean? (2) What speaks for it and (3) against it? (4) What alternatives are available? (5) What speaks for and (6) against each? And (7) what alternatives are most plausible in light of these considerations?<sup>16</sup>

Kaufmann advocated this canon of integrity, not only for

scientists, but for individuals who participate in any system, be it political, religious, interpersonal, philosophical or ethical. Though not a scholar of Jainism, Kaufmann's unique location as a lifetime scholar of religion and philosophy, both east and west along with his emphasis on personal authority and empiricism, makes him an especially useful conversation partner for the present endeavor. His concise and elegant texts, though widely unknown, are germane to contemporary issues of identity and autonomy across disciplines. As such I frequently turn to them to enrich my own thinking and feel compelled to familiarize others with his insights, so relevant for our time.

Though the kinship between Kaufmann's sentiments on autonomy and the scientific method of discovery is evident, his canon offers all individuals an epistemological method that values rigorous empiricism, intuition, and the need to articulate "the defects of significant alternatives."<sup>17</sup> Only in weighing such alternatives and considering the various aspects of one's experience can one "choose responsibly," or act in autonomy.<sup>18</sup>

### **Svrāja: A Precedent for Autonomy in Jainism**

Jains value autonomy as well, and the concept of *svarāja* or "self-rule" was an essential component for Gandhi's nonviolent movement. Gandhian scholar Pratibha Jain suggests that Gandhi's primary legacies were his autonomous interpretation of Jaina doctrines and the subsequent variations he developed. Gandhi transformed personal practices of nonviolence into collective action and he extended his reinterpretation of vows beyond the purpose of self-purification so that they became tools for political peace that hastened Indian independence. Gandhi even authorized the euthanasia of a calf who was suffering, an act of intervention typically unheard of for Jains.<sup>19</sup> Autonomy is seen in contemporary Jainism as well. Jains develop hybrid worship practices that blend Jaina and Hindu ritual that suit their communities. Jaina art and sculpture integrates Jaina narratives with cultural and social developments. Dr. Mehta at Jaipur Foots exercises autonomy by focusing more on the physical and economic needs of amputees in

the current moment, rather than the abstract future of *mokṣa*.

In fact, built into Jainism are doctrines of relativity, *anekāntavāda*, *nayavāda*, and *syādvāda*, which validate infinite viewpoints and those who hold them. For this reason, it might seem intuitive to the average Jaina that autonomy has prominent precedence in Jaina practice and Jaina texts. Yet, it is important to remember that, per Kaufmann, autonomy does not exist for its own sake. It is the result of continuously applying the canon to weigh alternatives so that one can make fateful decisions by discerning what speaks for and against certain alternatives. Though the Jaina theories of relativity often rely on the story of “The Blind Men and the Elephant” to synthesize various viewpoints, the task of a rigorous empiricism as well as autonomy and integrity is to evaluate the alternatives at hand, knowing that some may be better than others; that not all differences may be reconciled into a single elephant.

It is important to note here that Kaufmann does not reject religious beliefs or ontological presuppositions out of hand. In fact, he is quite clear that one might choose to participate in a religious community after evaluating alternatives.<sup>20</sup> He does insist, however, that for such a decision to be autonomous, the belief system and its components must be subjected to the canon.

In this way, he echoes the practical epistemological plurality of many philosophers of science such as John Stuart Mill or Paul Feyerabend who sought to safeguard the community of existing ideas so that the totality of thought even inherited, outdated or incomprehensible conjecture were seen as contributions toward ongoing discovery. Mill, speaking of his father’s insight into matters of logic wrote that, “[His] explanations did not make the matter at all clear to me at the time; but they were not therefore useless; they remained as a nucleus for my observations and reflections to crystallize upon.”<sup>21</sup> Likewise, Feyerabend has insisted that scientific discovery depends on the freedom of all ideas, including religion and metaphysics. Without this freedom, a scientist would be severely disadvantaged, “His imagination is restrained, and even his language ceases to be his own.”<sup>22</sup> Within

Jaina literature, Kundakunda offers a similar canon regarding the dialectic of empirical and transcendental, suggesting that both means of knowledge are essential for a thorough understanding of reality. It is to this dialectic that we now turn.

Kundakunda, the second-century Digambara philosopher and mystic was a celebrated author and innovative thinker. Among his prolific writing, many texts are given canonical authority, and his three major works are *Pravacanasāra* and *Pañcāstikāyasāra* and *Samayasāra*. The last of these, *Samayasāra*, which means “Essence of the Soul,” is the focus of this paper. In it, Kundakunda employs a unique dialectical method that emphasizes two crucial standpoints by which reality can be viewed: the *vyavahāra-naya*, which is the empirical standpoint; and *nīścaya-naya*, which is the transcendental standpoint. This two-fold dialectic corresponds to the complex Jaina understanding of *jīva*, meaning the essence of a living being. Jaina scholar Jeffery Long describe these distinctions succinctly:

[The *jīva*] has a substantial, unchanging aspect (*dravya*), characterized by intrinsic qualities (*guṇas*), and a constantly changing, karmically determined aspect...<sup>23</sup> Kundakunda takes the two aspects of *jīva*, permanent and unchanging, as his starting point for his methodological dialectic. *Vyavahāra* is the perspective by which one engages the changing, material world and *nīścaya* is the ultimate perspective by which one perceives the soul in its pure, unmixed state. From these two perspectives, Kundakunda erects a “super-structure” by which he “views the empirical Self from [an] empirical standpoint and the transcendental Self from the transcendental standpoint.”<sup>24</sup> The empirical and transcendental standpoints are essential to Kundakunda’s entire philosophy and add a crucial dimension to the broader theory of relativity *anekāntavāda* within Jainism, upon which Kundakunda’s dialectic depends. *Anekāntavāda* is a unique Jaina alternative to the Brahmanism and Buddhism of the time. On the one hand, Brahmanism suggested that all reality was unchanging Brahman and the visible world of transformation is *māyā*, or illusion. On the other hand, Buddhism was emphasizing the momentariness of Reality, so that only change

explains the Real. Jainism presents a metaphysical system that values change as well as permanence, as noted in Long's description of the *jīva*. These metaphysics are expressed in the theories of *anekāntavāda* and its two wings *syādvāda* and *nayavāda*. *Anekāntavāda* is a metaphysical claim that reality is multifaceted with infinite qualities. As such, there are infinite perspectives from which reality can be viewed. *Nayavāda* is an "analytical method of investigating a particular standpoint which does not rule out other different viewpoints and is thereby expressive of a partial truth about an object."<sup>25</sup> *Syādvāda* is a method of synthesis "designed to harmonize the different viewpoints arrived at by *nayavāda*."<sup>26</sup> As mentioned earlier, Jains often use the story of "The Blind Men and the Elephant" to illustrate these three aspects of Jaina metaphysics. The elephant functions as a many-sided Reality. The men, blinded by their karmic obstructions, can only experience the part of the elephant that they are touching. So one, feeling only the tail, says the elephant is like a snake. One, feeling only a leg, says the elephant is like a tree, etc. *Nayavāda* is the method of exploring how the elephant may be like a tree and a snake; how multiple perspectives may be partially true. *Syādvāda* is the explanatory method by which these multiple perspectives are held in tension, such that the elephant is both like a snake and like a tree; the elephant is both not like a snake and not like a tree. Kundakunda's dialectic of *vyavahāra-naya* and *niścaya naya* presupposes the theories of *anekāntavāda*, *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*. According to S. M. Shaha's research on Indian epistemology, Kundakunda's dialectic represents a unique path of ethical and spiritual empiricism that few others adopted.<sup>27</sup> Nevertheless, when it comes to issues of Jainism and contemporary science, Kundakunda's dialectic of *vyavahāra* and *niścaya* are a sensible starting point because they provide a methodological framework by which we can evaluate empirical and religious claims. Specifically, *vyavahāra*, as the empirical perspective, is a logical foundation that Jaina scientists could potentially base their ongoing exploration upon.

### **Kundakunda's Dialectic: Its Potential and Limitations**

Kundakunda's use of *vyavahāra* and *nīścaya* is unique in that he makes the two perspectives inseparable from one another. Both represent modes of epistemology that provide insights into the apprehension of reality, whether through intellect, will, feeling, emotion, cognition or pure consciousness. Although Kundakunda clearly privileges the *nīścaya* viewpoint as the ultimate, he maintains a relationality between the two that seems promising.

He opens his text by putting the pure *jīva* in relation to empirical actions and attitudes of Right Conduct, Right Faith and Right Knowledge.<sup>28</sup> He initially places the transcendental Self as the "beautiful ideal in the whole universe,"<sup>29</sup> and he recognizes "the proposition that all living beings are characterized by desire for worldly things [and] enjoyment of the same."<sup>30</sup> He validates the Knower as both "unique and self-identical" to reality, clarifying his place between Brahmanic Vedānta and Buddhistic perspectives that preserves empirical uniqueness as well as ultimate Real.<sup>31</sup> He unequivocally states that "From the *vyavahāra* point of view, conduct, belief and knowledge are attributes (as different characteristics) of the Knower, the Self"<sup>32</sup> and should be understood in relation to a Self that is undifferentiated. In this way there appears to be a space where the *vyavahāra* and *nīścaya* perspective require one another. Kundakunda gestures toward the invaluable role played by the *vyavahāra* perspective when he writes:

Just as a non-Aryan (foreigner) cannot be made to understand anything except through the medium of his non-Aryan language, so the knowledge of the Absolute cannot be communicated to the ordinary people except through the *vyavāhara* point of view.<sup>33</sup>

The empirical world seems to play a necessary role in perceiving the *nīścaya-naya*. Knowing the scriptures, and utilizing the belief, knowledge and experience of conduct available to us in the practical world are all essential tools to apprehending the Ultimate. Although he clearly qualifies the *vyavahāra-naya* as a less complete perspective, while *nīścaya-naya* is a total perspective, he allows the two to exist as valid complimentary perspectives:

The pure standpoint which reveals the pure substance should be adopted by (those whose object is to be) the seers of the supreme state of the soul; but the practical one by those who are satisfied with a lower status.<sup>34</sup> This dialectic initially looks like it will provide space between the conceptual ideal of the Self and the practical experience of the Self, much like the way an abstract inductive hypothesis is tested by concrete, empirical means. The *nīścaya* Self acts as a possibility space, what Kundakunda calls “the unitary sub-stratum”<sup>35</sup> or ideal that interfaces with the empirical world of *vyavahāra*, so that knowledge of both leads to collaborative growth.

But this dialectic does not last long as Kundakunda quickly places *vyavahāra*, not only on a more inferior level than *nīścaya*, with some interplay between the two ways of knowing, but ultimately discards *vyavahāra* as a valid way of knowing altogether. As Shaha points out, “By *vyavahāra-naya*, Kundakunda means: the differential, the particular, the impure, the modal, the accidental, the unreal, the non-existing, the formal, the pervert, the gross, and the discardable aspect of reality. It simply diagnoses the unhealthy, unnatural, despicable, diseased condition of the empirical self. It is the lowest rung of the ladder of the *nayas*.<sup>36</sup> Not only does the *vyavahāra* standpoint have no insight to lend to the fullness of the *nīścaya* standpoint, but it becomes a perspective to be discarded or exterminated in order that it may be replaced with pure knowledge that cannot be empirically tested, but must be trusted and believed. He who, subjugating the senses, realizes that the self is of the nature of real knowledge is verily called a conqueror of the senses by the saints who know reality.<sup>37</sup> Sense perceptions are to be eradicated as “alien dispositions,”<sup>38</sup> and the organs and objects of sense perception as misleading illusions. Not only is the transcendental Self absolutely separate from the senses, “without colour [sic], without smell, imperceptible to touch, without sound, not an object of anumana or inferential knowledge, without any definite bodily shape,”<sup>39</sup> but the empirical self actually falsely “builds within himself the various types of sense-organs” by which he perceives

the world of illusory objects.<sup>40</sup> The mistrust of the senses is not unknown to contemporary science. In the twentieth-century, many scientists made an effort to revise the scientific method so that its underlying assumptions would be subject to greater scrutiny, patience and peer review. German philosopher of science Carl Hempel criticized inductive reasoning as being based on false assumptions and Polish biologist Ludwik Fleck warned scientists to be on the lookout for bias in the premises of experiments. In theory this resulted in a more rigorous scientific method that involved defining the initial question more precisely, and added more cycles of hypothesis and testing, followed by publication and retesting. In practice however, many academics have suggested that this new methodology has little to do with the process of scientific discovery. Belgian chemist and philosopher Isabelle Stengers maintains that science cannot escape being a “‘dangerous exercise,’ implying ‘groping experimentation’ resorting to measures that are not very respectable, as they belong to the order of dreams, of esoteric experiences, intoxication, or excess.”<sup>41</sup> Feyerabend claims that the only way to maintain a creative and humane science is by allowing “charlatans and cowards” into the university so that theories and imagination clash.<sup>42</sup> However Kundakunda forecloses the relationship between *vyavahāra* and *nīścaya*. The transcendental ideal cannot be influenced by the empirical world and those who wish to study it. Rather the transcendental Self becomes a trump card over the empirical Self, caught perpetually in the delusion of its karmic bonds. There is no avenue of interaction by which the empirical self, defined by its karmic bondage, can add to, subtract from or transform the metaphysical presupposition of the ultimate Self. Inevitably the empirical self is defined by “wrong faith, wrong knowledge and wrong conduct.”<sup>43</sup> Those who investigate perceptive experience are condemned as having “dull intellect,” being victim to “sheer ignorance.”<sup>44</sup> Far from a true *naya* or valid perspective, the empirical becomes an enemy of the transcendent and its fruits of imagination, creativity, and skepticism are rendered meaningless.<sup>45</sup> Further, only by the removal of all *bhava*, or emotional attachment

such as desire, aversion or dissatisfaction, can one be free of the unwieldy burden of the empirical Self.<sup>46</sup> But where does this leave a scientist, when it is precisely the excitement of conjecture, or dissatisfaction with the status quo that drives curiosity, yearning, and ultimately the empirical process. A science null and void of all feeling or investment, “indifferently experienced”<sup>47</sup> as Kundakunda encourages, would never have resulted in the Copernican Revolution.<sup>48</sup> A Self utterly neutral to the material world, exhibiting “neither a desire for the present changes nor a longing for the future ones,” would never have developed carbon dating or genetics that are so essential to our increasing understanding of a complex and enchanting world.

The *Samayasāra*, or “Essence of the Soul,” ends up, not merely as a pure transcendent state to “contemplate upon,”<sup>49</sup> but a tyrannical abstraction that renders the empirical reality moot.

### **The Promise of the Abhavya**

Though the dialectic of *vyavahāra* and *niścaya* ends up being more a totalitarian relation of the transcendent over the empirical, Kundakunda does not leave us totally empty-handed. The autonomous empiricist, exercising his *svarāja* (self-rule), intent on employing the scientific method as well as Kaufmann’s canon to explore relevant alternatives to transcendental and empirical claims, can still find inspiration from an unlikely series of passages in the *Samayasāra*. In the eighth chapter, Kundakunda describes the *abhavya* as a “person incapable of spiritual liberation.”<sup>50</sup> This concept predates the *Samayasāra* though the reason for developing such a category is unclear. Padmanabh Jaini’s research on Jaina purification posits that the theory of *abhavya* “may simply reflect the commonplace observation that some individuals show no interest whatsoever in their salvation.”<sup>51</sup> Jaini speculates that the *abhavya*, because she has no interest in salvation, may parallel the phenomenon of “rotten seeds” that are “forever incapable of spiritual growth” found in some Buddhist texts.<sup>52</sup> But the *abhavya* in Jainism is not forever incapable of such growth, nor does she necessarily abandon the spiritual quest. On the contrary, an *abhavya*

may still be a devout and committed Jaina, who, according to Kundakunda, “observe[s] vows, carefulness, restraints, rules of conduct, and penance as described by the Jinas.”<sup>53</sup> Further, the *abhavya* is not anti-tradition or anti-religious. “No doubt he has faith in (a kind of) *dharma*,” writes Kundakunda, “he acquires it, he delights in it and practices it all with the object of future enjoyment.”<sup>54</sup> Though this *dharma* may not lead to the total destruction of *karma* and will not result in *mokṣa*, he may still be “well versed in all the scriptures,” though he lacks the “faith” that can grant him liberation.<sup>55</sup> The *abhavya* does relinquish the possibility of attaining *mokṣa* but not necessarily its conceptual influence. In fact, no text denies that an *abhavya* may have quite a dynamic spiritual life that includes study of scriptures, manipulation of *karmas*, and even births in higher heavens. Yet this type of person can also employ a true dialectic. This dialectic permits the transcendent perspective of *nīścaya* to inform and guide, but not ultimately trump, the empirical life. Neither does it require unquestioned obedience or allegiance to presupposed ontological categories like soul, *mokṣa* or *karma*. One is able to exercise the inventive imagination necessary to develop an idea and then exercise the “canon” as described by Kaufmann to evaluate its meaning, what speaks for and against it, exploring what speaks for and against relevant alternatives and by deciding what alternatives are most plausible in light of these considerations.

This type of empiricism does not oblige us to check our transcendental ideals at the door any more than it requires a complete suspension of the data provided by our senses. Rather, it invites a constitutive interplay between the conceptual abstractions and practical manifestation, where each inform and transform the possibilities and power of the other. As English mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead suggests, “You cannot think without abstractions; accordingly it is of the utmost importance to be vigilant in critically revising your modes of abstraction.”<sup>56</sup>

The *abhavya* is one who holds the transcendent and empirical in tension, without stacking the cards on the side of regulative

principles or beliefs that trump empirical discovery. It allows a process of inquiry to unfold rather than dictate its telos at the outset as karmically or ontologically determined. According to Stengers, “It is rather a deliberate experimental exercise in partiality,” resisting the ultimacy of pre-given truths that exist outside the material world as well as “resisting what is given as obvious through perception and by language.”<sup>57</sup>

Embracing the faith of an *abhavya* is not without costs. The *abhavya* represents for Kundakunda the lowest form of knowledge and, at least in Jaina texts, it is often treated with disinterest at best and outright disdain at worst. Yet the *abhavya* represents a compelling dialectic position between transcendence and empiricism that represents not only an embrace of multiple *nayas*, but also of the fundamental doctrines of *anekāntavāda*, *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* upon which the core of Jaina doctrine rests.

Additionally, it exemplifies an integrated and fearless exploration of alternatives that is, as Kaufmann tells us “the heart of rationality, the essence of scientific method, and the meaning of intellectual integrity.”<sup>58</sup> It forecloses neither the possibility of the transcendent nor the insights provided through empirical discovery and the continuous retesting and growth of ideas, experience and spiritual precepts.

### **Conclusion**

The “scientific” nature of Jainism, has to be redefined and clarified by every generation. The truths discovered by Kundakunda and his dialectic of empirical and transcendental perspectives is a valuable insight that contributed a unique thread among diverse religions as well as within Jainism itself. However, like all beliefs and propositions, for it to remain vibrant and lively in the present time, it must be subject to the canon of evaluation, comparison and empirical critique. For Jainism to maintain contemporary status as “scientific,” it must participate with, though not be captured by, the general understanding of science as a rigorous process of imagination, verification, review and revision.

This canon is not meant only to evaluate religious claims

alone but exists as a tool for those *abhavyas* who neither give full authority to the observable world nor to the unobservable truth claims inherited through family, society, religion and tradition. Both scientific and transcendent possibilities play together in a true dialectic in which both provide necessary value to the other. This play can lead to unexpected points of collision, where differences must be explored with a discriminating eye; where not all difference can be subsumed in the same proverbial elephant. This discernment has ample precedence in Jaina thought, including the sentiments of Kundakunda. “The Self,” he writes, “is realized by discriminative wisdom. Just as he is separated by discriminative wisdom so also by the very same discriminative wisdom he is realized.”<sup>59</sup> Such wisdom may well rest in relinquishing the ontological premises that devalue empirical discovery, experiential authority and the exploration of alternatives. But such is the burden of the *abhavya*, one who holds *mokṣa* as an autonomous and responsive way of life and not a preemptive premise. The *abhavya* understands that the concept of liberation places demands on the present moment even as the present moment informs and transforms the concept of liberation. For the autonomous empiricist, Jainism as a “scientific religion” requires the faith of an *abhavya*, an unbeliever whose integrity permits him the embodied potential of the rich Jaina scriptures as well as the delight and dissatisfaction that drives his open, creative path.

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27. Shaha, 20-1. Rather, two other very similar nayas (philosophical perspectives from which a particular topic can be viewed) the *dravyārthika* and *paryāyārthika*, found prominence in Jaina thought.
28. Shri Kundakunda, *Samayasāra*, with English Translation by A. Chakravarti (Banaras: Bharatiya Jnanapitha, Kashi, 1950) v. 2, 3.
29. *Samayasāra*, v. 3.
30. *Ibid*, v. 4.
31. *Ibid*, v. 6.
32. *Ibid*, v. 6-7.
33. *Ibid*, v. 8.
34. *Ibid*, v. 12.
35. *Ibid*, v. 48.
36. Shaha, 21, my italics.
37. *Samayasāra*, v. 31.
38. *Ibid*, v. 35.
39. *Ibid*, v. 48.
40. *Ibid*, v. 98.
41. Isabelle Stengers, “*The Answer of a Happy Elephant*,” in *Process Studies Journal*, Vol. 37.2 (2008) 170.
42. Feyerabend, *Against Method*, 163.
43. *Samayasāra*. v. 89.
44. *Ibid*, v. 96.
45. *Ibid*, v. 99.
46. *Ibid*, v. 177, 185.
47. *Ibid*, v. 194.
48. *Ibid*, v. 247, 250.
49. *Ibid*, v. 205.
50. *Ibid*, v. 273.
51. Padmanabh S. Jaini, *The Jaina Path of Purification* (Delhi: Motilal Banaras Publishers, 1998) 140.

52. *Ibid.*

53. *Ibid.*

54. *Samayasāra*, v. 275.

55. *Ibid.*, v. 275. Both Cort and Dundas explain that *mokṣa* is actually not available for Jains in our present time cycle.

According to Jaina cosmology/cosmography, *mokṣa* will not be available until we leave this predominantly ‘bad’ cycle of time and enter a predominantly ‘good’ cycle of time, which could conceivably be 80,000 years or more. Given this consideration, all Jains are in a sense *abhavya* in that *mokṣa* is not currently available.

56. Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (SMW) (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925) 59.

57. *Ibid.*

58. Kaufmann, 61.

59. *Samayasāra*, v. 296.

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